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Abstract
Traceability links among different software engineering
artifacts make explicit how a software system was imple-
mented to accommodate its requirements. For secure and
dependable software system development, one must ensure
the linked entities are truly traceable to each other and the
links are updated to reflect true traceability among changed
entities. However, traditional traceability relationships link
recovery techniques are not accurate enough. To address
this problem, we propose a traceability technique based
on refactoring, which is then continuously integrated with
other software maintenance activities. Applying our trace-
ability technique to the proven SSL protocol design, we
found a significant vulnerability bug in its open-source im-
plementation. The results also demonstrate the level of ac-
curacy and change resilience of our technique that enable
reuse of the traceability-related analysis on different imple-
mentations.
Keywords traceability, refactoring, maintenance, security
1 Introduction
Requirements traceability is defined as “the ability to de-
scribe and follow the life of a requirement, in both a for-
wards and backwards direction” [10]. Existing traceability
approaches aim to recover traceability links that connect el-
ements of certain software engineering artifacts in require-
ments, design and implementation [1, 8, 4, 13]. In general,
none of them can recover accurate requirements traceability
links that preserve the semantics of traced elements.
On the other hand, high assurance is required in se-
cure and dependable software systems development. A
single inaccurate requirement traceability link assumed by
developers may already be exploited by malicious attack-
ers. To assure high trustworthiness, software using such
mechanisms must be analyzed thoroughly. In [15], we pro-
posed an approach for establishing that the design of crypto-
based software based on the security extension to UML
(UMLsec[14]) satisfies relevant security requirements us-
ing automated theorem provers. In [16, 17], we showed
how one can link a Java-based implementation of a crypto-
protocol to its representation in UMLsec using assertions.
In such experience, it is however non-trivial to insert the
right assertions at the right place in the program. As the
implementation or the used libraries evolve, the instrumen-
tation may no longer guarantee correct traceability links.
Moreover, it is unclear whether and how such assertions can
be reliably transferred to a different implementation of the
protocol.
This work was motivated by the need to accurately trace
the design to the implementation of a crypto-based soft-
ware. By accurate traceability, we mean that the imple-
mentation is verified to satisfy the specification in the de-
sign, without introducing any false relations between them.
We propose an approach to maintain accurate traceability
through refactoring. We have developed a change resilience
refactoring language and tools in order to maintain accu-
rate traceability in a process continuously integrated with
other software maintenance activities. Through accurate
and change-resilient traceability, the analysis of implemen-
tation errors of a design model can be reused to analyse a
different implementation of the same design.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposal, we
show how to apply refactoring-based traceability to crypto-
graphic protocol implementations. Our method was applied
to JESSIE and JSSE, open-source implementations of the
Java Secure Sockets Extension in order to establish accurate
traceability. For different versions of the implementation as
well as different implementations of the same protocol de-
sign, we demonstrate that our refactoring tool enables reuse
of the test cases for vulnerability analysis and aspects for
security hardening.
The next section presents the properties of traceability
required by secure software maintenance, followed by an
explanation of our refactoring-based traceability approach.
Section 3 illustrates the rationale and implementation of the
tool support by a running example. Section 4 explains the
approach presented at the hand of an application to the In-
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ternet security protocol, SSL.
2 Traceability for maintenance
To be useful for maintenance of dependable software
systems, traceability needs to be as accurate as possible.
When a model element is changed, false negative traceabil-
ity may lead to neglects of some updates; whereas false
positive traceability may lead to unnecessary updates. Us-
ing search-based traceability techniques [1, 4], precision
(i.e., whether the keywords match with the selected docu-
ment) and recall (i.e., whether all matching documents are
selected) metrics determine the accuracy of recovered trace-
ability links. When precision and recall are below 100%, as
are in usual cases, false traceability is inevitable.
To support software evolution, accurate traceability also
needs to be as resilient to change as possible, that is, trace-
ability links remain true even when the models change.
With change resilient traceability, one does not need to
update a link as long as it can still accurately relate the
changed artifacts. Otherwise, traceability links have to be
rediscovered whenever changes happen.
Taking advantages of accuracy and change resilience, the
traceability can be applied to secure and dependenable soft-
ware maintenance, in many useful ways: (1) By checking
whether all elements in the design are traced faithfully into
the implementation, one can tell whether an implementa-
tion has correctly carried out a given design. This is a direct
application of traceability. (2) While accurate traceability
to the same design has been established for two implemen-
tations, through transitive relations, one can trace between
elements in these two implementations. Such indirect trace-
ability, whenever possible, can help to derived parts of the
implementation from the other. Consider existing test cases
used to validate correctness of one implementation to the
design. If such test cases do not exist for another implemen-
tation of the same design, one can construct them based on
the ones exist in this implementation. (3) The traceability
process can then be continuously integrated with other in-
teractive and automated maintenance activities. Whenever
changes to the models are committed to a shared repository
as a result of other maintenance activities, necessary trace-
ability steps will be triggered in order to maintain the benefit
of (1) and (2). The change resilience property can help re-
duce the effort in such maintenance due to the fact that the
traceability may not always need to be updated.
Software refactoring [9, 21] changes the internal struc-
ture of an implementation without changing its external be-
havior. Thus in this work, we propose to use refactoring
steps to obtain and maintain accurate traceability. We first
show it possible to obtain accurate traceability among de-
sign and implementation elements using refactoring steps;
then we illustrate how to improve change-resilience of
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Figure 1. Maintain Traceability
refactoring steps using declarative refactoring scripts that
can be translated into context-sensitive ones. Then we use
derived traceability and continuous integration to explain
benefits of refactoring-based traceability support.
Figure 1 shows the big picture of how our tools are in-
tegrated to support traceability for maintenance of secure
software.
2.1 Refactoring for accuracy
Using refactoring, we can create accurate traceability be-
tween design and implementations. In a round-trip, one can
(1) convert the identifiers/methods to names at the design
level, and (2) convert the names on the design level to iden-
tifier/method names in the implementation. Through a se-
quence of refactoring steps, every occurrence of a selection
of program elements can be transformed into their counter-
part design elements.
Since refactoring maintains external behavior un-
changed, one can transform a program entity into another
without worrying about losing accuracy in behavior. Apply-
ing refactoring for a number of steps, the resulting program
produces the same results. Therefore, the traceability tran-
sitively from the original program to the resulting program
remains accurate. The resulting program is typically more
abstract than the original because refactoring steps are used
to improve understandability of the program.
To make sure that the resulting program maps to the de-
sign element accurately, additional program understanding
tasks may need to be performed by the analyst. In our case
study of the security protocol implementation, for example,
a variable named after the design element “R C” should be
a random seed, which can only be verified by finding out
that it was assigned by the returned value of a random num-
ber generation function in the library. Once the relation be-
tween the refactored program element and the design ele-
ment is confirmed by the analyst, the original program en-
tity also accurately traces to this design element, no matter
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whether it was originally named “Random” or it was origi-
nally a sequence of statements.
2.2 Refactoring for change resilience
Having accurate traceability links between design sym-
bols and program entities established, one would maintain
them even when some design symbols or program entities
change. Due to the fact that refactoring steps can be ap-
plied with a certain precondition, that is, they are applicable
only when the program meet a certain pattern in a certain
context. We need to specify the minimal requirement of
the application context of refactoring steps such that they
are still applicable even if the original program changes.
It is also preferable to have traceability links automatically
maintained.
Modern refactoring-supported IDE’s, e.g., Eclipse, sup-
ports automatically record and replay applied refactoring
steps. When the source code is not changed, in other words,
these recorded steps can be replayed if the code is exactly
the same. However, when code changes slightly, they often
fail to replay. For example, an “Extract Method” refactor-
ing can substitute a selection of statements into a method.
If there is a statement inserted before the selection, then the
refactoring will not be replayed.
In order to allow refactoring on changed code, we
designed a declarative refactoring specification language.
Combining with the changed code, the specification script
pinpoints the exact context for the refactoring steps. In ad-
dition, the declaration can characterise an applicable con-
text using fewer parameters by virtue of regular expressions.
These parameters and expressions were initially generated
from the refactoring steps recorded in the IDE using a trans-
formation utility. By changing all spaces into all possible
separators in the selection criteria, for example, a pretty for-
matting or obfuscation of the program will not block the ap-
plication of the “Extract Method” refactoring. The change
resilience can be further improved by adapting the regular
expressions in the specification, for example, by ignoring
any renaming to local variables. Existing clone detection
algorithms could also be applied to allow for slightly modi-
fied code to match.
2.3 Derived traceability
When there are two implementations of the same design,
accurate traceability may enable reusing the analysis results
of one implementation for the analysis of the other. Arti-
facts including refactoring scripts, test cases, aspects, can
improve the understanding of one implementation, they can
also be useful in analysing the other implementation if the
traceability links between design and both implementations
are bijective. Take a test case for example, if all its pro-
gram elements P can be traced to design elements D, and
all these relevant design elements can be traced to those in
another implementation Q, then it is possible to reuse the
test case by substituting elements in P with the counter-
parts in Q. Suppose that a program element p ∈ P is traced
to a design element d ∈ D through a sequence of refactor-
ing steps R1, and a program element q ∈ Q is traced to the
same design element d through another sequence of refac-
toring steps R2. The substitution of p to q can be achieved
by first applying the refactoring R1 to the test case, then
apply the refactoring R2 inversely.
Most refactoring steps are invertible as they are equiv-
alent transformation of programs. For example, “Rename
variable” from A to B is the invert step to “Rename vari-
able” from B to A. For more complex refactoring steps
(e.g., “Extract Method”), the invert step is a different kind
of refactoring (e.g., “Inlining Method”). Thus it is possi-
ble to allow traceability links to be composed as the derived
traceability.
2.4 Continuous integration
Continuous integration1 has been adopted by our process
where the regression test subprocess is augmented with the
regressive refactoring: whenever code or model changed in
the repository – e.g., a developer committed a set of changes
– the continuous integration script will check out the change
set into a sandbox to conduct various automated build and
tests. Adding our refactoring scripts to the continuous in-
tegration script enable the regression security engineering.
The error report subprocess is also augmented with an ex-
planation of the counter example of potential attack traces
and the mismatch between the UMLsec model and the im-
plementation code.
3 Tool support
In this section, we explain the tools we implemented sup-
port the traceability for our case study. These tools are built
on top of the Eclipse IDE, the CruiseControl continuous in-
tegration tool and our UMLsec tools.
A running example To illustrate, Fig. 2 shows a series
of refactoring steps applied to a small “Hello World” pro-
gram. The example is explained in the context of Eclipse
IDE, where a number of refactoring steps are supported in
the tool.
Assume that the source file abc.java is initially located
at a folder src in the project abc. The refactoring steps
are applied as follows. Step 1: Class abc is renamed to
1See M. Fowler and M. Foemmel. Continuous integration.
http://www.martinfowler.com/articles/ continuousintegration.html
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Figure 2. Refactoring for traceability
hello and abc.java is renamed to hello.java accordingly.
This refactoring step is called rename.type. Step 2: The first
statement System.out.println is extracted into the body of
a new method print hello(). All instances of the selected
statement are substituted at once, resulting in a 2-to-1 map-
ping. This step is called extract.method. Step 3: The ex-
pression ”Hello” is explicitly assigned to a new local (tem-
porary) variable string. This step is called extract.temp.
Step 4: The temp variable string is promoted into a field
named as message. Finally, Step 5: The method main2
is renamed to a new method name main. This last step is
called rename.method.
After these steps, the refactored program is traced to the
UML class model intended by the designer, as shown to the
left of Fig. 2. The traceability between the design elements
(class names, method names and field names) and identi-
fier/method names are established. Moreover, each refac-
toring step is a program transformation that preserves the
behavior before the step. Note that the refactoring-based
traceability is not one-to-one mapping between the source
and the target. In other words, a single refactoring step
can update multiple references in the design/program. As
each refactoring step is well-known, one can understand the
traceability between the original design and the final imple-
mentation.
Refactoring support in Eclipse The general refactoring
engine in Eclipse is provided by a set of plugins called the
refactoring Language Toolkit (LTK)2, which allows one (1)
2http://www.eclipse.org/articles/article.php?file= Article-Unleashing-the-Power-
of-Refactoring
to perform refactoring steps, (2) to save the history of refac-
toring steps into an XML-based script, and (3) to apply a
refactoring script automatically. The plugins are applicable
to any programming or specification language. The Java
Development Tool (JDT), for example, instantiates LTK
with a number of Java-specific refactoring steps. Fig. 3
shows a snippet from the refactoring script, which briefly
specifies the rename.type and extract.method steps used at
the first two steps.
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<session version="1.0">
<refactoring comment="..."
id="org.eclipse.jdt.ui.rename.type"
description="Rename type ’abc’"
project="abc" input="/src&lt;abc.java[abc"
name="hello" ... />
<refactoring comment="..."
description="Extract method ’print hello’"
id="org.eclipse.jdt.ui.extract.method"
project="abc" input="/src&lt;{hello.java"
name="print hello" selection="64 28" ... />
...
</session>
Figure 3. Eclipse refactoring script, Cf. Fig. 2
Every refactoring is recorded as an XML element refac-
toring, whose attributes specify the step. Every step has an
identifier attribute ID, indicating the type of the step. For
example, here org.eclipse. jdt.ui.rename.type is a name
internally used by JDT to identify the rename.type refac-
toring. For readability, in the remainder of the paper we
omit the common prefix and simply call it rename.type.
The target of a refactoring step for rename.type is a new
class name, whereas the target for extract.method is a new
method name. They are completely specified by the name
attribute. The source of a refactoring step is suggested by at-
tributes including project, input and optionally selection.
The values of these attributes typically indicate the context
of a step. The project attribute specifies the subject project
of the refactoring step; inherited from LTK, the input at-
tribute is a composite of the source folder, the source pack-
age, and the source class name which are separated by de-
limiters “&lt;”, and “[”; the selection attribute, when used,
specifies the exact offset and length of the string selected
for the refactoring.
In our example the extract.method refactoring is only
applicable if the selection of a substring of 28 characters
starting from the offset 64 in hello.java matches the state-
ment to extract, character by character including the white
spaces. Given such strict specifications of refactoring con-
texts in Eclipse, one can see that existing refactoring scripts
are inadequate if source code has been modified by evolu-
tion or by previously applied refactoring steps, or source
code from different library implementation is used. For ex-
ample, it is required to modify the offset/length value if an
extract.temp step has been applied earlier.
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@{org.eclipse.jdt.ui.rename.type,
project="abc", source="src", package="",
class="abc", name="hello"
}
@{ org.eclipse.jdt.ui.extract.method,
project="abc", source="src", package="",
class="hello", method="main",
toclass="hello", name="print hello",
regexp="S.*("Hello");", count="1"
}
Figure 4. Our spec. for refactoring (cf. Fig. 3)
Refactoring scripting In the subsection, we present our
new refactoring engine that overcomes the limitation of the
native Eclipse JDT refactoring steps. It makes the refac-
toring steps reusable for maintaining design traceability in
different legacy code.
One would reuse the traceability information discovered
when linking the implementation to the UML model for ex-
ample if one wants to apply the refactoring steps defined for
one implementation (e.g., JESSIE 1.0.1) to a different ver-
sion of that implementation (e.g., JESSIE 1.0), or to a differ-
ent library (e.g., JSSE). To this end, we create a refactoring
plugin that can apply parameterized refactoring steps3. Our
refactoring tool is implemented on top of LTK refactoring
plugins, which supports languages beyond Java. In order
to keep the changes to the existing refactoring engine lim-
ited, we invoke the context-specific refactoring steps in JDT
by instantiating a scripting template with the parameters de-
rived from our specifications.
In [19], Krueger classified software reusability as five
connected facets: abstraction, classification, selection, spe-
cialization and integration. Our traceability refactoring en-
gine supports this view.
Our declarative specification language abstracts away
context-sensitivity of existing refactoring steps and can de-
scribe any refactoring step supported by LTK. Correspond-
ing to Fig. 3, Fig. 4 lists two refactoring steps in our speci-
fication language.
In the record of our refactoring specification, most fields
have evident meaning and usage as they correspond to the
attributes in the Eclipse refactoring scripts. We introduce
new fields to compute the context of the source element,
such as source, package. Optionally, the field condition
indicate a selection to be refactored by a generic condition
(e.g., a regular expression). Such selections increase the
chance of reusability for context-sensitive refactoring steps
when changes happen to the code. We can actually de-
rive the condition from the concrete context. For example,
by replacing white spaces with arbitrary number of white
spaces. In this way, even if a programmer or a code for-
3These automated refactoring tools (ART), including their source code
and examples in the paper, can be fetched from the project subver-
sion repository http://computing-research.open.ac.uk/repos/art (username:
guest, password: checkout).
matter inserted indentation spaces, the selection can still be
matched. Also we introduce the count field to selectively
refactor some instances of matching selection rather than
the first matched one. The selection parameter gets spe-
cialized from the other parameters by parsing the selection
source using existing API in the IDE.
As refactoring consists of a sequence of steps, we
classify existing refactoring steps by context-sensitivity
and discuss its impact on exchangeability and invertibil-
ity. Context-free steps are more reusable whereas context-
sensitive ones require care. For round-trip traceability, all
refactoring steps need to be invertible. Since refactoring
steps are behavior semantics-preserving, inverting them is
generally feasible. Context-free steps are already invertible
without consulting code (e.g., by inverting the source/target
of the rename.type step). For context-sensitive steps, we
made them invertible with the aid of code and the editing
command stack because the information in the refactoring
specification alone is not sufficient.
In Table 1, we list some JDT refactoring steps that have
been parameterized in our refactoring tool. We also show
which JDT steps are considered change resistant and a brief
description on how such limitations are resolved.
Our tool delegates the domain-specific (here Java) refac-
toring integration tasks to LTK. During the integration, we
support programmers to preview the effects of refactoring if
they choose to, and to avoid manually constructing the spec-
ification from the saved refactoring history in Eclipse. The
implementation of our refactoring plugin adds two com-
mand buttons to the Eclipse GUI, one of them performs all
refactoring steps automatically, while the other brings up a
dialogue for each step to preview the effects of refactoring.
This allows us to verify if there are any potential mainte-
nance problems arising from the step. For example, when
renaming a variable to R C, we can see a warning message
from the Eclipse IDE that by programming convention, it is
not recommended to let the name a variable start with cap-
ital letters. Such a renaming does not affect programmers
because they can always edit the original source code. We
also implemented a headless tool to invoke the functionality
of the automated button as a RCP command. The arguments
of the command provides the name of refactoring specifica-
tion file. In this way, our automated refactoring step can be
integrated continuously with other processes.
Another utility program we implemented is a transfor-
mation that converts an XML-based refactoring script from
Eclipse IDE into our own specification language. The trans-
lation is done automatically by converting the XML at-
tributes of the <refactoring> tag into fields of one record
in our specification language. Special parsing to XML at-
tributes such as ”input” is performed as well, to encode the
context to ease reuse. Whitespaces in “selection” attribute
are globally substituted with an equivalent regular expres-
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Table 1. Some refactoring steps parameterized by our refactoring tool
ID change resilient? context source selection specified in Eclipse our specification
org.eclipse.jdt.ui.rename.project no workspace project project project
org.eclipse.jdt.ui.rename.folder no project folder folder folder
org.eclipse.jdt.ui.rename.package no folder package package package
org.eclipse.jdt.ui.rename.type no package class class class
org.eclipse.jdt.ui.rename.method no class method method method
org.eclipse.jdt.ui.move.method no class method method method
org.eclipse.jdt.ui.extract.method yes class statements (offset, len) (regexp [, count])
org.eclipse.jdt.ui.rename.temp yes method variable (offset, len) (regexp [, count])
org.eclipse.jdt.ui.extract.temp yes method expression (offset, len) (regexp [, count])
org.eclipse.jdt.ui.promote.temp yes method expression (offset, len) (regexp [, count])
sions. After translation, one can further simplify the regular
expressions to enhance change-resilience.
Continuous integration We extend the CruiseControl
system by adding tasks to the ANT build and test scripts. A
daemon process on the build/test machine periodically mon-
itors whether there is any change to the repository. When-
ever changed artifacts (including the code, the model, the
test cases, the refactoring scripts and the security aspects
and assurance test cases) are committed, the event triggered
a run of the extended ANT build.xml script.
<project name="jessie" default="test" basedir="jessie">
<target name="build" depends="refactoring"/>
<target name="test" depends="build"/>
// the following tasks are augmented
<target name="umlsec"/>
<target name="refactoring"/>
<target name="saspect" depends="test"/>
</project>
The dependencies between the targets of the build.xml
are straightforward. Before one can build the new system,
the modified code must be refactored such that the changes
committed by the programmers are synchronised with the
model. The UMLsec security check for model vulnerability
is done after the system is built and refactoring is done. Fi-
nally, security assessment are performed to validate the se-
curity requirements and security hardening aspects are per-
formed to enforce vulnerability checks.
4 Example Application: SSL
We will explain the approach presented in this paper at
the hand of an application to the open source implemen-
tation of the Internet security protocol SSL. SSL is the de
facto standard for securing http connections, which however
has been the source of several significant security vulnera-
bilities in the past and is therefore an interesting target. In
this paper, we concentrate on the fragment of SSL that uses
RSA as the cryptographic algorithm and provides server au-
thentication (cf. Fig. 5). We have used automated theorem
provers to verify the UMLsec model of the SSL protocol
Figure 5. The SSL handshake protocol
against the relevant security requirements such as secrecy
and authenticity using our tools [16].
The JESSIE Project The whole JESSIE project currently
consists of about 5 MB of code, but the part directly rele-
vant to SSL consists of less than 700 KB in about 70 classes.
The implementation of the SSL protocol in JESSIE is only
briefly documented by the comments in the program. Many
important design elements in UMLsec (cf. Fig. 5) are miss-
ing in the program document.
Trace design to implementation After the security anal-
ysis of JESSIE version 1.0.1, we have identified 19 distinct
symbols used in design models for cryptographic handshake
protocols [18]. Table 2 presents 9 instances of such map-
ping. The first column shows the names of symbols as used
in the cryptographic protocol model. The second column
shows the names of corresponding methods in the JESSIE
library. The third column shows the identifiers that are the
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target names of the refactoring steps. The types of the refac-
toring step is shown in the last column.
For each message in the sequence of an execution of the
SSL handshake protocol (see Fig. 5), we perform a series of
refactoring steps to establish traceability in the JESSIE 1.0.1
implementation. Table 3 lists the first four messages steps
S1 to S4 in the message sequence protocol. One can also see
that in general there does not need to be a one to one corre-
spondence between the design and the code. For all the 19
symbols, 7 messages and 3 checks in Fig. 5, in total we have
defined 27 refactoring steps in the specification to maintain
the traceability between the protocol design and the JESSIE
1.0.1 code. The third column shows count of changed seg-
ments by the refactoring steps. Using diff, each block of
changes, even when it contains multiple lines, is counted as
one. When the number is larger than the number of steps,
changes have happened to more than one places on average.
The last column shows performance, i.e., how much time
in seconds it took to perform the refactoring steps using our
tools. Given the significant pay-off provided by the fact
that the behavior of the code is preserved during the com-
plex refactoring steps, such kind of performance figures do
not impose a bottleneck within the overall process. On the
contrary, much more time is spent on the security analysis
and the manual creation of the refactoring steps, which will
be paid back by reusing the scripts on different implemen-
tations.
The cryptographic protocol analysis requires for exam-
ple that all the messages related to the cryptographic check
Veri(X509Cert s) (see Fig. 5) be intercepted and logged.
The difficulty with applying AOP for such an instrumenta-
tion is that the joinpoint for such a check Veri(X509Cert s)
does not exist in SSLSocket.java as a method. In-
stead, the check is implemented as a group of statements
of the whole doClientHandshake() method (lines 1518
Table 2. Mapping messages to methods
Symbols Program methods Identifiers Refactoring op.
1. C clientHello C rename.type
2. S serverHello S rename.type
3. Pver session.protocol P ver extract.temp
version
4. RC clientRandom R C rename.temp
RS serverRandom R S rename.temp
5. Sid sessionId S id rename.field
sessionId S id rename.temp
6. Ciph[ ] session.enabledSuites Ciph extract.temp
7. Comp[ ] comp Comp extract.temp
8. Veri Lines 1518–1557 Veri extract.method
9. Dnb getNotBefore() D nb rename.method
Dna getNotAfter() D na rename.method
Table 3. Refactor the protocol (cf. Fig. 5)
Messages in sequence op. diff Time (sec)
S1: C → S : (Pver, RC , Sid,Ciph[ ],Comp[ ]) 7 31 13.891
S2. S → C : (Pver, RS , Sid,Ciph[ ],Comp[ ]) 5 20 9.437
S3. S → C : Certificate[X509Certs] 2 2 1.474
S4. C : Veri(X509Certs) 2 2 3.854
... ... ... ...
Total of 7 messages and 3 checks 27 86 40.303
Table 4. Test cases exposing vulnerability
Message Example Test Case
S1
Case1: ClientHello(TLSv1, clientRandom1,
[B@b012a558, enabledSuites1, zlib)
Case2-4: ClientHello(TLSv1, clientRandom2,
[B@b01b0558, enabledSuites2, zlib)
S4
Case1,2: cheVal((107,2,2),(108,3,2))==True
Case3: cheVal((107,2,1),(107,3,1))!=False
Case4: cheVal((107,2,3),(107,3,1))!=False
through 1557 in the JESSIE library version 1.0.1). There-
fore, an “extract.method” refactoring is necessary. Sim-
ilarly, the cheVal joinpoint as a group of statements in
SSLSocket.java (lines 1571–1604) needs to be refactored
as a method.
Vulnerability analysis and hardening Using a number
of test cases, in the JESSIE 1.0.1 implementation, we found
a significant security vulnerability as Veri( X509Cert s) is
not always invoked when the certificate message is received,
which is a required and essential security check according to
the protocol specification. It is needed because otherwise a
man-in-the-middle attacker could insert a forged certificate
containing his own public key into the communication and
thereby decrypt the session key that is encrypted using that
key, and thus eavesdrop on the encrypted communication
in that session without being noticed by the communication
partners. Additional checks can be inserted into the proto-
col to harden its security. For example, using an aspect to
crosscut every joinpoint of the program where a certificate
is received, we found nothing is called by the program to
check the issuing date. Therefore we find it is necessary
to instrument the program with the functionality to check
validity of the certificate against its date range issued by
OpenSSL.
Table 4 highlights the vulnerability by showing the ex-
ecution log of 4 different test cases. If the certificate was
checked, in Case 3 and 4, the cheVal should report false in
a correct implementation. However, we found they reported
true instead.
The vulnerability we found from the refactored program
do exist in the original program, however, it was hidden
from the joinpoint model of our security aspect before refac-
toring. Therefore, fixing such vulnerability by weaving an
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aspect on the refactored code can also, in fact, improve the
implementation of the original program. After renaming
checkValidity to cheVal, the aspect in Fig. 6 inserts an ad-
ditional check on the validity of certificate date (cheVal).
Also, the refactored Veri is called right after a certifi-
cate is obtained through the pointcut expression certifi-
cate(). Without these refactoring steps, this aspect cannot
be weaved with the original program. This aspect is derived
public aspect CryptoProtocolSecurity {
pointcut certificate():
call(* Certificate.Certificate(..));
Object around(): certificate() {
X509Certificate[] X509Cert s = (X509Certificate[])
proceed();
SSLSocket s = (SSLSocket) thisJoinPoint.getThis();
for (int m=0; m<pCs.length;m++) {
assert cheVal(pCs[m].D_nb(), pCs[m].D_na()):
"+++ The date is invalid +++";
}
s.Veri(X509Cert s);
return X509Cert s;
}
}
Figure 6. A security aspect, cf.Table 4
from the protocol design model introduced earlier assumes
the existence of a method for Veri. This method is cre-
ated from the given implementation using an extract.method
refactoring for the doClientHandshake method to extract
58 lines of code into a new public method Veri in the
SSLSocket class. The extracted Verimethod is then called
in the advice to reimplement the already existing check. In
addition to this check, we then first introduced an additional
cheVal method into the SSLSocket class and then moved
it into the aspect module using the Move Method refactor-
ing step. After these refactoring opertaions, the date validity
check is performed before the existing certificate check.
From this example, one can see that refactoring serves
two purposes. First, it reveals the control flow for instru-
menting the program as a joinpoint. Second, it makes it
possible to modularize the check into a security hardening
aspect for reuse.
Reuse derived traceability Having studied one imple-
mentation of the cryptographic protocol in JESSIE 1.0.1, we
aim at reusing our vulnerability analysis in the reference im-
plementation of the same protocol in JESSIE 1.0.0, as well
as in JSSE, a library in the standard JDK since version 1.4.
The source code of JSSE library (after 1.6) can be checked
out from the OpenJDK repository4.
To perform the model-based security analysis as ex-
plained above on a different version of JESSIE or a differ-
ent library (JSSE), one only needs to modify the specifica-
tions of the refactoring steps that provide the traceability of
4https://openjdk.dev.java.net/svn/openjdk/jdk/
trunk/j2se/src/share/classes/sun/security/ssl
Table 5. Reused refactorings, cf. Table 3
Messages JESSIE 1.0.1 JESSIE 1.0.0 JSSE 1.6
op. diff op. diff op. diff
S1 7 31 7 33 5 23
S2 5 20 5 21 4 16
S3 2 2 2 2 2 2
S4 2 2 2 2 2 2
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Total 27 86 27 89 21 68
the model to the implementation level, without making any
other adjustments to our refactoring engine and the analysis
code, such as test cases and aspects.
We have shown in Table 3 how many refactoring steps
were applied to JESSIE 1.0.1 (released on October 12, 2005
according to its CVS repository) according to a maintain-
able refactoring specification. Table 5 shows how many
steps in Table 3 can be reused on JESSIE 1.0.0 (released
on June 9, 2004 according to its CVS repository), and JSSE
1.6 (released on May 8, 2007).
Inside the org.metastatic.jessie.provider package in
JESSIE the 1.0.1 version has got 24 code block differences
compare to that of 1.0.1 version. Due to these changes,
the selection-sensitive steps in the refactoring history script
saved from Eclipse cannot be applied to JESSIE 1.0.0. After
converting the script into our specification language, all of
them become reusable in our enhanced refactoring engine
(cf. the column JESSIE 1.0.0). The only necessary change
made to our original refactoring specification for JESSIE
1.0.1 was a global substitution of the project attribute for
all steps from jessie-1.0.1 to jessie-1.0.0. Table 5 com-
pares the number of diff blocks for themselves before and
after refactoring. The numbers is differed slightly because
of the evolution changes to the variable Ciph.
On the contrary, even after we performed a global substi-
tution of the project name, for the JSSE 1.6 case, we found
that most of the steps cannot be applied as is. The do-
Handshake protocol is mainly implemented in the class
SSLSocket of the JESSIE 1.0.1 library, whereas in the
JSSE library implementation in the OpenJDK 1.6 (here-
after called JSSE 1.6), the protocol is mainly implemented
in the class sun.security.ssl.HandshakeMessage. Nev-
ertheless, the naming of the symbols can be traced to the
implementation.
Table 6 lists some mapping from the symbols in Table 2
to their naming in the JSSE library. The difference to the
earlier table for the JESSIE project is mainly in the second
column, that is, the source of the refactoring steps given in
the third column.
To reuse the existing refactoring steps, we have to in-
stantiate their specifications with different parameters for
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Table 6. Traceability in JSSE, cf. Table 2
Symbols JSSE 1.6 op.
1. C HandshakeMessage.ClientHello rename.type
2. S HandshakeMessage.ServerHello rename.type
3. Pver protocolVersion extract.temp
4. RC clnt random rename.temp
RS svr random rename.temp
5. Sid sessionId rename.temp
6. Ciph[ ] cipherSuites extract.temp
7. Comp[ ] compression methods extract.temp
8. Veri CertificateVerify.verify() rename.method
9. DnotBefore cert.getNotBefore() rename.method
DnotAfter cert.getNotAfter() rename.method
its source (i.e., project, folder, package, class) and its
context (i.e., regexp, count). In some cases even the type
of refactoring step needs to be changed. For example,
Veri(X509Certs) is refactored by the extract.method step in
JESSIE (Table 2, and by the rename.method step in JSSE
(Table 6). Such changes do not influence the target name
attribute for the steps because they are derived from the
same protocol design.
As part of the library release, two model-based unit tests
for the message sequences in JESSIE 1.0.1 were provided:
testclient.java and testserver.java. After refactoring, we
were able to reuse them for the two other implementation
libraries as well.
Moreover, the model-based security aspect we imple-
mented for JESSIE 1.0.1 can also be reused without change.
When weaving in the security aspect, we could determine
that it did not further harden the security for JSSEbeyond
the existing implementation since the security check imple-
mented in the aspect is already correctly enforced in JSSE.
This is confirmed by the logs of the two test cases that were
reused. These test cases also helped us to verify that the
messages are sent and received in a way consistent with the
message sequence chart (Fig. 5), on both sides of client and
server, regardless of the implementation library.
5 Related work
Traceability and model synchronization Software
maintenance makes use of related models at different
stages of development. Example models are goal trees for
requirements, UML diagrams for design and source code
for implementation. When some model elements change, it
is necessary to synchronize the change on related elements
in order to maintain all models consistent [12]. Existing
traceability approaches aim to recover traceability links that
connect elements of certain software engineering artifacts
in requirements, design and implementation [1, 8, 4, 13].
Search-based techniques recover traceability links between
documents and code with a precision below 100% [1, 13];
a probability-model based approaches relies on a softgoal-
interdependency graph to recover traceability links
between functional and non-functional requirements [4];
a scenario-driven approach generates traceability links
from observations of system executions [8]. Other work
on requirements tracing includes [23]. In general, none of
them can recover accurate requirements traceability links.
Though efficient techniques have been proposed to account
for incremental update of traceability links recovered from
search-based approaches, these incrementally maintained
traceability links are still as inaccurate [13]. Graph
transformation-based techniques [12] may accurately trace
structural semantics, yet another mechanism is required to
trace behavioral semantics.
Reverse engineering Existing reverse engineering frame-
works were proposed to improve accuracy of traceability
for reference architecture [22] and for known design pat-
terns [2]. In our previous work [25], refactoring were pro-
posed to enable accurate abstraction of behavioral imple-
mentations such that they can be compared to the goal-
oriented requirements. In this work, refactoring is not only
used for comparing the source and target, but also for trans-
forming the source into the target.
Refactoring scripts Dig et al [5] first studied the evolu-
tion of component API that can be replayed as refactoring
steps. They argued that the refactoring of library compo-
nents may indeed change the behavior of the overall system
especially when the client of the components are not refac-
tored accordingly. For example, a function ‘foo’ may be re-
named to ‘bar’ in the library, yet the call site of the function
may still try to invoke ‘foo’, only to find broken contracts.
Therefore, it is useful to keep track of (or detect in Dig’s
case) the refactoring steps as a script such that they can be
replayed at the client side. Our tool supports tracking refac-
toring steps by translating the refactoring steps recorded
by the IDE into change resilient refactoring specifications.
Comparing with [5]’s work, our use of refactoring is not for
replaying the changes, rather for maintaining the traceabil-
ity between design elements and implementation regardless
of changes. Though the RefactorCrawler tool [5] cannot be
used directly, we can make use of the refactoring preview
dialog code in the MolhadoRef tool [6].
Refactoring for aspects In [11, 20], specialized refactor-
ing actions are defined mainly for aspect-orientation. In this
work, we expand the scope to any general-purpose refactor-
ing steps supported by existing tools. We have exploited
the opportunity to perform aspect-oriented instrumentation
in order to harden the security that require general-purposed
refactoring actions. In [3], Binkley et al proposed a num-
ber of aspect-aware refactoring transformations to convert
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object-oriented programs into aspect-oriented ones. If the
design element is implemented by crosscutting code, then
Binkley et al’s technique may be applied to our work to
maintain the traceability between such elements. Since
refactoring alone does not change the behavior of the sys-
tem, aspects derived from such refactoring transformations
must not change the behavior. Consequently, they cannot
improve the security of existing implementation. In our
work, we employ AOP to instrument the code with addi-
tional functionality to enforce security hardening. There-
fore our aspect is introduced by a different purpose.
Tracing and validating aspects In [7], Antonio Castaldo
D’Ursi et al discussed the difficulty of static analysis where
multiple aspects that potentially interfere with each other
through intertype declarations. Such problems are well
known in the AOP community as aspect interference prob-
lems. Our case study only introduced one security hard-
ening aspect for vulnerability check, which certainly did
not expose interference. Yet it is possible in general, if the
software systems have used aspects, or more than one as-
pects were refactored from the legacy system (using e.g.,
Binkley’s [3] methodology). In a separate work [24], we
proposed a goal-based testing framework to trace and vali-
date aspects according to their goal-oriented requirements.
In the security and mission-critical domain, such test-based
validation alone may not be adequate. It is thus an open
research issue to investigate how aspect interference can be
prevented. Our tracing framework presented here helps sim-
plify the task by relating the scope of aspects to the associ-
ated requirement/design elements.
6 Conclusions
We showed that refactoring can be used to support the
maintenance of accurate traceability links. In order to main-
tain such traceability resilient to changing design and im-
plementation, we enhanced the Eclipse refactoring engine
in an automated refactoring tool support. The traceabil-
ity refactoring process, together with our UMLsec analysis
tools, are integrated with other maintenance activities con-
tinuously. Supported by the derived traceability in test cases
and aspects, a traceability-related vulnerability found in one
implementation can be effectively verified in another. The
proposed approach was applied to three implementations
of SSL protocol (i.e., JESSIE1.0.1, 1.0.0 and JSSE1.6) and
actually detected a security vulnerability in JESSIE1.0.1,
which was further confirmed in JESSIE1.0.0, and rejected
in JSSE1.6.
Acknowledgements: This work is partly funded by the Royal
Society through an international joint project with TU Munich.
The authors would like to thank H. Lin and C. Li for discussions on
the Jessie project. Our ART tool uses the LTK refactoring dialog
implemented in by Dig et al in [6].
References
[1] G. Antoniol, G. Canfora, G. Casazza, A. de Lucia, and E. Merlo. Re-
covering traceability links between code and documentation. IEEE
Trans. Softw. Eng., 28(10):970–983, 2002.
[2] D. Beyer, A. Noack, and C. Lewerentz. Efficient Relational Calcula-
tion for Software Analysis. TSE, 31(2):137–149, 2005.
[3] D. Binkley, M. Ceccato, M. Harman, F. Ricca, and P. Tonella. Tool-
supported refactoring of existing object-oriented code into aspects.
IEEE Trans. Software Eng., 32(9):698–717, 2006.
[4] J. Cleland-Huang, R. Settimi, O. BenKhadra, E. Berezhanskaya, and
S. Christina. Goal-centric traceability for managing non-functional
requirements. In ICSE’05, pages 362–371. ACM, 2005.
[5] D. Dig, C. Comertoglu, D. Marinov, and R. Johnson. Automated de-
tection of refactorings in evolving components. In ECOOP, pages
404–428, 2006.
[6] D. Dig, K. Manzoor, R. Johnson, and T. N. Nguyen. Refactoring-
aware configuration management for object-oriented programs. In
ICSE, pages 427–436, 2007.
[7] A. C. D’Ursi, L. Cavallaro, and M. Monga. On bytecode slicing and
aspectJ interferences. In FOAL ’07, pages 35–43, New York, NY,
USA, 2007. ACM.
[8] A. Egyed. A scenario-driven approach to trace dependency analysis.
IEEE Trans. on Software Engineering, 9(2), 2003.
[9] M. Fowler and K. Beck. Refactoring: Improving the Design of Exist-
ing Code. Addison-Wesley Professional, 1999.
[10] O. C. Z. Gotel and C. W. Finkelstein. An analysis of the requirements
traceability problem. In RE, pages 94–101. IEEE, 1994.
[11] J. Hannemann. Role-Based Refactoring of Crosscutting Concerns.
PhD thesis, Univ. Brit. Col., 2005.
[12] I. Ivkovic and K. Kontogiannis. Tracing evolution changes of soft-
ware artifacts through model synchronization. In ICSM ’04, pages
252–261, 2004.
[13] H. Jiang, T. N. Nguyen, and I. Chen. Incremental latent semantic
indexing for effective, automatic traceability link evolution manage-
ment. In ICSE’08, 2008.
[14] J. Ju¨rjens. Secure Systems Development with UML. Springer, 2004.
[15] J. Ju¨rjens. Sound methods and effective tools for model-based se-
curity engineering with UML. In ICSE, pages 322–331. IEEE/ACM,
2005.
[16] J. Ju¨rjens. Security analysis of crypto-based Java programs using au-
tomated theorem provers. In ASE, pages 167–176. IEEE/ACM, 2006.
[17] J. Ju¨rjens and Y. Yu. Tools for model-based security engineering:
Models vs. code. In ASE. IEEE/ACM, 2007.
[18] D. Kirscheneder. Method for comparison of Java implementations
and UML models. Technical report, TU Munich, 2006.
[19] C. W. Krueger. Software reuse. ACM Comput. Surv., 24(2):131–183,
June 1992.
[20] R. Laddad. Aspect Oriented Refactoring. Addison-Wesley Profes-
sional, 2006.
[21] T. Mens and T. Tourwe. A survey of software refactoring. TSE,
30(2):126–139, 2004.
[22] G. C. Murphy, D. Notkin, and K. J. Sullivan. Software reflexion
models: Bridging the gap between design and implementation. TSE,
27(4):364–380, 2001.
[23] G. Spanoudakis, A. Zisman, E. Pe´rez-Min˜ana, and P. Krause. Rule-
based generation of requirements traceability relations. Journal of Sys-
tems and Software, 72(2):105–127, 2004.
[24] Y. Yu, N. Niu, B. Gonzlez-Baixauli, W. Candillon, J. Mylopoulos,
S. Easterbrook, J. C. S. do Prado Leite, and G. Vanwormhoudt. Tracing
and validating goal aspects. In RE’07, pages 53–56. IEEE, 2007.
[25] Y. Yu, Y. Wang, J. Mylopoulos, S. Liaskos, A. Lapouchnian, and
J. C. S. do Prado Leite. Reverse engineering goal models from legacy
code. In RE’05, pages 363–372, 2005.
10
